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UNDER THE MISTS OF HGPE: PARTISAN IMAGE IN THE  
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1989 - 2010)

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# Under the mists of HGPE: partisan image in the Brazilian presidential campaigns (1989 - 2010)<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

The electoral advertising on television, called HGPE, for many defined as "authoritarian rubbish", arbitrary interference on the legitimate right of choice of programming by the spectator, is one of the main sources of political communication in the Brazilian electoral democracy. The HGPE, although defined as mandatory by its critics, especially the television networks, has a voluntary audience much larger than one might imagine.<sup>2</sup> In 2006, the average audience during the first round of elections, according to IBOPE, was 55.9 points, rising to 63.2 points in the second round. The indexes would be similar to the biggest television hits in Brazil, as are some soap operas. The Datafolha data confirm the high audience of HGPE: in the first round of 2010 on average 53% of the respondents said they watched the campaign on television, while in the second round this average rose to 60%.

Prime sources of information about the candidacies available and government programs, the HGPE, by tradition, is already part of the political culture and Brazilian electoral dynamics. For this reason it is important to study the contents of the HGPE in order to grasp the message type that political elites try to convey to the electorate and that they believe is more effective in attracting votes.

In this field, my research objective has been to analyze the role of political parties in electoral advertising on television. What would be the relevance of partisan institution in diagramming TV's campaign? In other words, what would be the weight of the political party in the construction of argumentation of the campaign? What would be its visibility in the campaign and the quality of that visibility?

Observing the general rules for granting the television space to candidacies, political parties should be considered the protagonists of their campaigns, once the time for political propaganda is intended for free, in proportion to the size of their parliamentary benches in the different levels of the Federation. The HGPE is presented

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<sup>2</sup> The audience is voluntary in the sense that the viewer is free to decide if he wants to watch the political advertising. The HGPE is compulsory only for TV channels which are concessions of the Brazilian State.

to the voter twice a day in blocks situated separately from of the normal television programming during the two months preceding the date of election; its duration will be extended in the case of runoff for executive positions (Mayor, Governor and President). Thus, format and content of advertising are built by party agents or professionals hired by them.

These aspects of the Brazilian electoral legislation could result in intensely partisan campaigns, because of the communicative power that is given to their agents. However, the weakness of the party system and the personalizing associated with executive positions, favors the development of personalized electoral campaigns, sometimes containing anti-partisan speeches.

The study of political advertising that appears in Brazil thus requires an analysis of its electoral and party systems in order to identify how the contradictory demands of individualistic and collectivist character are articulate during the electoral campaign.<sup>3</sup> If, on the one hand, the Brazilian electoral system, "candidate-centered" (Samuels, 1997), provides a strong incentive for the individualistic campaign strategies, on the other hand, the model of political advertising on television requires that the individual interests of candidates should be subordinated to the collective strategies of political parties, since the television time is devoted to this. Thus, the Brazilian format of political advertising on television would work as strengthening the role that political parties play in the electoral process.

In this article I've started from the analysis of some data collected in previous studies in order to incorporate new information regarding the 2010's campaign. However, it was not only adding new data to a prior review. More than a discussion about the parties' image in the Brazilian electoral propaganda, the objective was to demonstrate that the polarization that was constituted in Brazil in recent years between PT and PSDB is not just in terms of political project, but also ideological about the role of parties like the democratic institutions.

The campaign of 2010 was exemplary in this sense, once has showed antagonistic political speeches. On the one hand, in the PT's campaign, we found the idea of continuity of a political project that, by being shared by a political group, could have the leadership transferred from one person to another (from Lula to Dilma) without the risk of substantive changes occurring. On the other hand, in the PSDB's campaign, we found a political project based on the intellectual and political capacity of the candidate himself, giving him the merit of good results of a Government whose leadership, President Cardoso, wouldn't be mentioned during the campaign.

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<sup>3</sup> About the representative institutions in Brazil and its functioning, see: Kingstone and Power (2008) and Nicholas and Power (2007).

In the first case, the idea of a political party is essential so that the argument can be convincing because it is the connection between different individuals in the same project; in the second case, the idea of a party is denied as an "evil in itself" and replaced by the ideology of national unity, captained by a leader whose moral strength, intellectual capacity and political skill, demonstrated in his life trajectory, would be enough to solve the problems in Brazil.

My argument is that the PSDB completed in the 2010 campaign an anti-partisan speech which had been developed in previous campaigns. The intention was to undermine the success of its opponents by attacking their strong points, party's discipline and organization, reinforcing the anti-party sentiments in the voters. Such sentiments would have origin in a political history of incipient democratic tradition, grown in an authoritarian socio-political structure and in a highly fragmented party system with a weak social rooting.


In this article I will discuss the results of some studies of the campaign segments designed by Brazilian political parties in recent years. The first data set (Index Image Projection of Party) is part of an unfinished study that takes into account campaigns for legislative and executive positions. The other graphs refer only to the presidential campaigns that occurred between 1989 and 2010.

The examination of quantitative data will be followed by a qualitative analysis directed specifically to the presidential campaign of 2010. The goal is to discuss the most relevant aspects of the role of political parties in the campaigns of the two main candidates in contention: Dilma Rousseff (PT) and José Serra (PSDB). The discussion on the role of the PSDB in the candidacy of José Serra focused on the anti-partisan speech undertaken by TV's campaign. The discussion on the role of PT in the candidacy of Dilma Rousseff, interestingly, focused on the participation of President Lula on his campaign on television, followed by a few additional considerations.

### **Party Image in Campaigning for Legislative and Executive Positions**

The goal in presenting the following chart is to demonstrate a broad overview of participation by the political parties in their campaigns to different positions, national and local executives and legislatives, in order to check the variation in the dimension occupied by them and discuss the possible reasons for the phenomenon.

Chart 1: Index Image Projection of Party (IPIP) 2004 – 2008



Source: Nucleus of Studies on Power, Political Parties and Elections (NEPPE) of the Brazilian Center for Research on Democracy (CBPD) - PUCRS.

The first fact that stands out is the discrepancy between the executive and legislative campaigns, of all parties, in the use of partisan signs. The use of party strategies can be five times higher in legislative campaigns than in campaigns for executive positions, in that year and undertaken by the same party. What would cause this phenomenon? The answer may lie in the characteristics of the Brazilian electoral system, combining different formulas for different positions, in order to distribute seats.

Elections for executive positions in Brazil have used the majority rule and are centered on the candidate. As party identification levels in Brazil are not significant to most parties, its ability to determine the vote is not very relevant. Although the ideological dimension cannot be ruled out, since it organizes the electoral competition, the Brazilian voters generally do not join political parties in a definitive way. What is perceived is an option for a given ideological field, whose party leader will vary at each election.<sup>4</sup> Thus, candidates for executive positions do not usually invest in the party dimension in their electoral advertisements.

Among the campaigns that use majority rule, the presidential campaign stands by the virtual absence of party brands, leading us to believe that the more local context of the election will be the largest partisan dimension in electioneering. In this case, however, one should take into account the fact that the party directories are

<sup>4</sup> This discussion is the objective of research that I developed about political speech on television campaigns. Regarding this subject, see: Dias, 2008.

responsible for the preparation of TV advertising: the presidential propaganda is prepared by the national party, which usually hires professional services to assist. The regional campaigns tend to be handmade; featuring a tight budget which is often prepared by the own party bureaucracy.

Studies made on the professionalization of electoral campaigns, often associate this phenomenon with the declining importance of political parties. The professionalization of electoral campaigns is characterized by the participation of non-partisan agents in its formulation and execution, rejecting the traditional party bureaucracy. Thus, the more professional the electoral campaign, less importance is given to political and partisan criteria, benefiting others related to the marketing of commercial products.<sup>5</sup>

For the data presented in the chart above, the presence of party signs is much more evident in the campaigns for legislative positions, as shown in columns related to the legislative campaigning (local, regional and national) in 2004, 2006 and 2008. We directed the explanation back to the electoral system as a determinant of the party behavior in the development of their television advertisements. In Brazil, the method for electing legislative positions is the proportional representation. Once given the electoral coefficient, which corresponds to the number of votes required for the election of each chair, the number of seats obtained by each party shall be determined by the total sum of their votes, either those that were given to the candidates individually, in either party label. Given the number of seats the party (or coalition of parties), these will be distributed to its strongest candidates. So it's interesting to the party, at the same time, stimulating the party vote and promoting popular candidates.

Another phenomenon contributes to the index which is higher in election campaigns for legislative positions: to promote the candidacy for the executive position. The spatial use of legislative campaign by the campaign to the executive is considered a collectivist strategy and therefore partisan, since what matters for the party is to elect the mayor, governor or president, while guaranteeing them support in the legislature.

### **Presidential Campaigns – 1989 to 2006**


Presidential campaigns are the most professionalized. The parties usually hire the specialized services of some advertising agency. What varies between the parties is the degree of control or influence they can have on the process of drafting the electoral propaganda on television. It is the ability of the party influence on the canvas

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<sup>5</sup> See: Plasser, 2001; Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002; Römmele, 2003; Days, 2005; just to name a few.

that is identified in the following charts, considering the propagation of their images. Only two parties have participated in all elections since the return of the direct vote for the presidency in Brazil: the PSDB and the PT, which will be the focus of this analysis. Two other parties that participated in three of the five elections during the period, were also analyzed: the PDT and the PPS.

Chart 2: Evolution of Party Image in Presidential Campaigns



Source: Nucleus of Studies on Power, Political Parties and Elections (NEPPE) of the Brazilian Center for Research on Democracy (CBPD) - PUCRS.


The PT stands out in the use of partisan image in his television program, especially in comparison with other parties. Between 1989 and 2006 all the parties analysed reduced the space for the projection of their images in the campaign, indicating the gradual professionalization of the presidential election campaigns. The 1998 campaign was the least partisan of the period, probably because of the strong influence that economic stability had exercised on the electoral dynamics of that time. The fear of the voters by loss of the inflationary control has generated a discursive homogeneity among the nominations.

In 2002, which was a 'changing election', i.e., an electoral context where it is perceived a broad desire in the electorate for political change, the image of the competing parties was reinforced. It was in this year that the PSDB had reached its highest level of image projection party, however, being still below 1, the minimum index which is considered to define the political party as a relevant actor in the electoral advertising.

In 2006, the PT's image suffered a significant reduction in the campaign, reaching its lowest rate in the period, probably because of corruption scandals involving its major leaders in the previous year. The most personalized PT's campaign focused on the image of President Lula as being responsible for government success.

In 2010 we found a new rise in the partisan image of PT and maintenance, with a slight fall, of the index of partisan image projection of PSDB. The increase of IPIP of PT and the anti-party discourse of PSDB in 2010 will be further analysed.

Chart 3: Projection of Party Image (average)<sup>6</sup>




Source: Nucleus of Studies on Power, Political Parties and Elections (NEPPE) of the Brazilian Center for Research on Democracy (CBPD) - PUCRS.

If we analyse the average standards, we observed that the party's trademarks may be found with significance only in the electoral propaganda of PT, this being the only party that can be considered the protagonist of his campaign. PDT and PPS participated with its own candidates in only three of the six campaigns which occurred in the period between 1989 and 2009. Both acted as supporting in their electoral propaganda, with the PDT being a more homogeneous player regarding the projection of its image, acting always as supporting. The PPS presented a merely figurative picture in the two campaigns which participated; only in 1998 recording a greater commitment in the projection of its image, reaching the Semi-Protagonist role. Finally, the PSDB, which did not go beyond the Figurative role, can be characterized as the party that relied more on the autonomy of its national leaders. The PSDB acted in a figurative role in four campaigns during the period. Only in 1989 and 2002 there was a more substantive presence of the party in the campaign; in both acting in a supporting

<sup>6</sup> Protagonist (1.51 – 2.0), Semi-Protagonist (1.1 to 1.5), a Supporting Role (0.51 -1.0), Figurative (up to 0.5), Non-Partisan (0).

role. In recent elections, the PSDB has reached the point of adopting an anti-party discourse, ignoring the importance of a strong party system as a safeguard for democracy (Dalton, McAllister and Watterberg, 2009). The mediation role exercised by political parties among the elite and citizens is fundamental in order to disconnect the direct relationship between demands and results. The failures of the parties in this mediation will be perceived as a failure of the political system itself. Therefore, the support of the democratic regime "will be based on support for the parties and trust of the party elites" (Deschouwer, 1996, pág. 268).


Chart 4: Evolution of Partisan Speech (1989 - 2010)



Source: Nucleus of Studies on Power, Political Parties and Elections (NEPPE) of the Brazilian Center for Research on Democracy (CBPD) - PUCRS.

In this chart we look at the incidence of party discourse, their proportion in the set of image projection during the party elections advertising on television. This means that in 1989 the party discourse was responsible for approximately 47% of the PT image in his campaign, about 53% corresponded to visual symbols, labels, among others. This percentage has suffered intense variation over time, but reached almost 60% in 2010. This phenomenon is explained mainly by references to President Lula, as the main party leadership, and to the Government that was ending. The year 1998 was what made the smaller partisan speech indexes for all parties, for the same reason: the centrality of the issue of economic stability. On the other hand, the PSDB recorded in 2010 its less Partisan Speech index in the campaign, consistent with the anti-party speech that took over.


Chart 5: Evolution of Partisan Speech (Average)



Source: Nucleus of Studies on Power, Political Parties and Elections (NEPPE) of the Brazilian Center for Research on Democracy (CBPD) - PUCRS.

PT and PDT are highlighted by the use of party discourse. During the campaigns of the PT, it was possible to observe that, on average, a quarter of their time on television recorded verbal references to the party, directly or indirectly. In the campaigns of PDT, the middle standard of verbal references to the party was around 18%. PSDB (5%) and PPS (3,3%) did not invest in this type of discourse. It is important to note that the PPS is another party that has been adopting a kind of anti-party discourse. The partisan references in television campaigns of these two parties are essentially based on images, many of them blurred, expressionless, some are nearly imperceptible.

Chart 6: Partisan Image Type (1989 - 2010)



Source: Nucleus of Studies on Power, Political Parties and Elections (NEPPE) of the Brazilian Center for Research on Democracy (CBPD) - PUCRS.

Finally, we classified the party image projection in the electoral advertising on Brazilian television in three categories: intense image, when the party stands out as the central character; diffuse image, when the presence of the party appears accompanied by the parties in the coalition supporting the candidacy; and indirect references, when the party identification depends on the deduction of the voter, which requires greater knowledge of the party dynamics. Again, PT and PDT are highlighted in the projection of its intense images, while PSDB and PPS have used a cloudy image or indirect references to themselves. The PSDB was the only party whose diffuse image predominated on the intense, which characterized him as the most personalized party in Brazilian electoral dynamics.

### **PSDB: Anti-party Discourse and the Negative Campaign**

During the 1990's, the academic literature on political parties was marked by discussion of the crisis or decline of political parties in contemporary western democracies. Part of this literature turned to investigate the anti-party sentiments identified in the political elites or in the public opinion. Such a sentiment would have as motivation the idea that the parties would be too self-interested, they would tend to the political conflict in place of the search for the common good; they would be unable to formulate consistent public policies and would be prone to corruption (Poguntke, 1996).

Poguntke drew attention to the fact that "any attempt to arrive at a better understanding of anti-party orientations must therefore focus on the interrelationships

of elite discourse and mass opinion" (page 320). When the elites emphasize anti-partisan arguments, they stimulate the popular resentment against the political parties, while the electoral success of such arguments takes the elites to manifest them in an even more explicit basis (Poguntke and Scarrow, 1996).

The presidential campaign of PSDB in 2010 set some anti-partisan arguments in an attempt to strengthen the anti-party sentiments against PT, the ruling party and main adversary. The following campaign speeches reflect the three essential characteristics of the anti-partisan sentiments described above.

**'Parties prefer political conflict in place of the common good':**

"This is why we need a Government of union, a Government of peace. We need to stop this business of the Party A being mortal enemy of Party B, a region being against another, brothers against brothers. Brazil is much bigger than that. " (Candidate's speech 23/10/2010)

**'Political parties are corrupt and self-interested':**

"The President cannot walk with bad people or give bad examples. He cannot accept the stealing in the next room. He cannot allow the public companies to be used by the party. Today, what happens? There is a lot of Ministry that only serves to promote employment favouritism for their gang. And it is you who pays the wages of these people." (Candidate's speech 27/10/2010)

**'Parties are incompetent and self-interested':**

"The country with which I dream is a country where the best path to success, to prosperity, will be the registration in a good public school and not a political party's card." (Candidate's Speech, 21/09/2010)

According to Webb (1996), two factors are decisive in spreading anti-party sentiments in an electorate: unemployment and the decline of the national economy. Another factor that contributes to the hostility or indifference to the parties would be, according to Webb, the absence of substantive differences between the two largest parties in dispute. None of these factors was present at the 2010 electoral dispute. The real increase in the number of formal jobs and the perception of economic growth, confirmed by the classification of Brazil as eighth world economy, were probably strong obstacles to the anti-party speech identified in the PSDB's campaign, the main opponent of the government. In addition, another argument of PSDB could have contributed to the anti-party sentiments in the electorate: the PT's Government would be mere continuity of the PSDB's Government and there would be no significant difference in the two administrative models. However, this argument lost its effectiveness in the comparison between the socio-economic outcomes of the two Governments.

Poguntke and Scarrow (1996) point out that the question of the anti-party sentiment can be investigated in two dimensions of mutual influence: of the elites and

of the masses. In this article, the focus is on the behavior of elites in the construction of the party image during the election campaign. Poguntke and Scarrow observe that the criticisms outlined by the elites to political parties can be theoretical or practical. In the first case, the criticism refers to the role of the parties as democratic institutions. In the second case, the criticism can assume the arguments of certain currents of democratic theory, as the Rousseauian, for example. In this perspective,

“(...) the expectation is that politicians’ actions should directly be guided by their awareness of the common good; this expectation inevitably leads to a negative evaluation of the role of political parties as distorting intermediaries between politicians and the general will.” (Poguntke e Scarrow, 1996, pág. 258)

The campaign of PSDB on the television assumed this type of perspective, if we consider, for example, the following candidate Serra's speech:

"And I'll use my independence, my political weight, to make a Government that faces the difficulties and major interests thwarted and that would not be a hostage of political parties, of this gang or another one." (Candidate's Speech, José Serra, 30/09/2010)

The argument in this discourse is that the autonomy of the candidate and his "political weight" are able to do more for the common good than partisan politics, here seen with contempt and treated with disdain. The expression "hostage of political parties" is extremely derogatory: who makes hostages are kidnappers, criminals who imprison people, threatening their lives in order to get certain demands, for example, in exchange for money or power. Another striking expression in this speech is the comparison between parties and "gangs", i.e. groups of people who pursue common goals, in general young and irresponsible, instead of treating them as political institutions. The goal would be to create an imaginary, at the same time, menacing and despicable of the role of political parties in democratic governments.

A speech that became paradigmatic of the anti-party campaign of PSDB in 2010 is transcript below:

"I built my way with work and effort. In all the positions I have exercised, I've always worked joining efforts, uniting good people never dealing with people because they are from Party A or from Party B, and that's it what needs to end up in Brazil. We need union. We have a hardworking people, a generous earth and a country too big to think small. "" (Candidate's Speech, José Serra, 08/10/2010)

This short speech of PSDB's 2010 campaign contains the essence of intellectual anti-party right thinking. IGNAZI (1996) argues that the essence of the

problem of anti-partisan sentiments is the belief in a harmonious whole, in the unit as a good in itself. "God is one. The church is one. The sovereign is one." (pg. 279).

In defence of the idea of unity and harmony as conditions for achieving the common good, the PSDB proposed repeatedly the image of a Government "above the parties", as shown in the following examples:

"And in the name of this new green economy, I say: Let's make a government of the people, a Government of union, above the parties, in favour of Brazil". (Candidate's Speech, José Serra, 10/10/2010)

"And this new Brazil which born now expects its new President make a Government of union, above the parties. And that he has the size of our homeland, gentle mother, loved homeland, Brazil." (Speaker, PSDB's Campaign, 15/10/2010)

"But I feel there is a hope: yes, we can face our problems as in health, education, security, anyway, the major problems of Brazil, without fights, in peace, with serious work and a Government above the parties". (Candidate's Speech, José Serra, 11/10/2010)

"You know what? The great challenge of the next President is education. Why? Because this is the future of our children and, therefore the future of Brazil. By this I proposed to make a National Pact for education; above the parties and of political disputes. During 10 years, at least, education would not be subject of political dispute. We need to unite the Brazil to advance in the quality of education and preparation of our children, our young people. This is our way." (Candidate's Speech, José Serra, 28/10/2010)

"To be President of Brazil one should have leadership, should be above the parties, should lead the nation. And to do this, my dear, we have just one person: Serra, 45." (Pastor Silas Malafaia, PSDB's campaign, 17/10/2010)

"Who has the leadership? Who is above of political parties? Who is prepared and have experience? Serra, 45. For President: Serra, 45. God bless Brazil. God bless you." (Pastor Silas Malafaia, PSDB's campaign, 21/10/2010)

In one of the aspects of the anti-party speech, as mentioned by Ignazi, there is hostility to any form of ideology or political conflict, founding its notion of politics merely on "good management". This would be a reaction to the intense politicization which occurred in the period that followed the Second World War; an idea of pacification of political moods: a return to the "peace and quiet".

The presidential campaign of the PSDB in 2010 constantly stated the intellectual superiority, ability and experience of its candidate with respect to opponents: "Serra is the most prepared" was the jargon synthesis. His political biography and the public policies implemented throughout his career were presented as unquestionable and indispensable credentials for the success of the Government. Besides the anti-party speech, here amply demonstrated, the technocratic model of public administration advocated by the candidacy of PSDB placed himself as counterpoint to party-political dynamics led by Lula's government.

The highlight of the PT in the Brazilian partisan scenario is, simultaneously, his fortress and fragility. The anti-party sentiments are part of the Brazilian society and the

proof is that approximately 40% of the electorate voted in a technocratic alternative. Poguntke (1996) noted that the vote in a party that uses an anti-party speech, contains an element of anti-party feeling. The antipathy of a part of the electorate to PT, and to political parties in general, was used in a hard-hitting way by the PSDB's campaign, especially on the internet.<sup>7</sup>

The technocratic discourse of PSDB, basing good governance on intellectual ability and technical quality of their leaderships, spotting the partisan institution, denying its role as protagonist in the democratic game, puts in check its own ability to form themselves into electoral alternatives. How to enforce a political party that bases its discourse in an anti-party argument? There should be one reason why important party leaders spoke at the end of the elections of 2010 in refurbishing PSDB and this party had experienced in 2011 the worst crisis of its history.

### **Lula as Guarantor of the Government Continuity**

As pointed out by Holmberg and Oscarsson (2011), in political systems where the parties have less importance to the electorate, the influence of leaders on their decision will be greater. In the United States, the capacity of leaders to capture votes for his party is strong, especially in presidential elections. Aardal and Binder (2011) agree with them and believe that the autonomy of leadership is inversely proportional to the strength of the party system: the weaker the links between voters and parties, the more prominent is the position of political leaders in attracting votes for their parties (Aardal e Binder, 2011, page 109). These authors, however, draw attention to the fact that other studies neglected the intervention of distinct partisan characteristics on the capacity of their leadership influence over the vote.

From data collected in nine countries, Aardal and Binder found that the size of the party is the most important variable in the effect of leadership in the vote. The impact of evaluation of the leadership is bigger about voters who vote for large parties than on those who vote for small parties. The governmental status would also be positively related to the ability of the leadership to influence on vote: the candidate who competes for re-election is favoured by the bigger visibility and their evaluation, since the Government results are satisfactory, will have greater influence on the vote. Finally, the age of the party is also positively associated with the influence of leadership: the older the party, the greater the effect of leader evaluation in the vote that is given to his

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<sup>7</sup> The set of videos "Brazil doesn't belongs to PT," whose authorship was assumed by PSDB, is a paradigmatic example of negative campaign against the PT in the elections of 2010. See: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V8K0altQzQM>, accessed 6/6/2011.

party. The general conclusion of the authors is that, contrary to a widespread assumption in the academia, political leaders have not become more important to voters than the parties or the political dynamic: these are dimensions related and of mutual influence.

The relationship of the Brazilian electorate with his party system is weak, being significant only to the partisan identification with the PT.<sup>8</sup> PT is among the oldest and largest political parties of the current Brazilian party system: created in 1979, it has launched candidates in all presidential elections that have occurred since 1989, the first direct election to the Brazilian Presidency after the military dictatorship. PT won the presidential election with Lula in 2002 and obtained his reelection in 2006. The case of the Workers' Party in Brazil confirms the ideal partisan design for the influence of leadership in attracting votes for his party, as found in the evidence analysed by Aardal and Binder: large party and leader of a successful former Government.

In 2010, the possibility of re-election of President Lula was constitutionally vetoed, then, PT launched Dilma Rousseff as its candidate to the Presidency. In the case of this presidential election, the transfer of the popularity of President Lula for his successor was notorious. Lula participated intensely in the campaign of Dilma Rousseff, making believe the vote in the candidate of the PT would be equivalent a vote in himself.

"In a couple of months I will no longer be President and I would be very happy to see the companion Dilma continue this work, because she is competent and warrior and helped me a lot to get here. For the first time after 5 elections my picture won't be there at the vote machine. But at the time you press the number 13 and see the picture of Dilma you will be voting on the candidate most prepared to be President and you will also be voting a little bit in me. Therefore, you who supports me and Dilma don't leave to vote this Sunday. We must defend what we conquered and ensure a better future for our children and our grandchildren. Thank you and a happy election." (President Lula, 29/10/2010)

According to Watterberg (2011), the personal image of leadership has not been the decisive factor in the presidential elections, contrary to the assessment of most scholars of the so called "candidate-centred politics". That is, the candidates best evaluated in terms of integrity, reliability, competence and charisma are not the ones that have been historically elected in the United States.

"The key to understanding the rise of candidate-centred politics in the United States is not personality politics, but rather the increasing importance of candidate-centred issues." (Watterberg, 2011, page 86)

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<sup>8</sup> On the subject see: Ames and Power (2009).

Watterberg (2011) has demonstrated that the phenomenon of politics centred on leadership in the United States can be classified into two types. The first one, more known and diagnosed by their peers, would be the leader that creates an identity separate from his party. The second one, identified in the latest elections, would be the candidate who becomes the dominant figure in a political context where the political party is often seen by the public through the prism of their leaders. These people become leaders not by force of their personalities, according to the author, but by the control of a specific political agenda (Watterberg, 2011, page. 90). Therefore, the issues discussed by the candidates will define its popularity and not aspects of his personality.

Once more the case of the election in 2010 in Brazil confirms the analysis of academic literature about the role of the party leadership in democratic elections. Lula became the guarantor of the Dilma's Government, but did not do so in a personalised way, but showing that her successor had a prominent role in the formulation of successful public policies of his Government. For example, Dilma would be the "mother of PAC (Growth Acceleration Program). Lula shared the merit of his Government when he linked Dilma to a collective project.

"I say without fear of making mistakes: much of the success of the Government is due to the coordination capacity of the companion Dilma Rousseff. In fact, I must say, there isn't today in Brazil anybody more prepared than Dilma. " (President Lula, HGPE, 17/08/2010)

The strategic objective was, at the same time, ensuring that the election of Dilma would represent the continuity of the Lula Government and demonstrate the competence of the candidate as manager, compensating his inexperience in elective positions. The candidate was presented in the propaganda of PT as a central member of Lula's Government team and as responsible for the implementation of several of its major public policies.

"Dilma becomes the right hand of Lula and the first woman in our history to be Minister of Mines and Energy, after the Minister Chief of Civil House. She coordinates the entire Ministry and programs such as ' Light to all ', ' PAC' and the 'My house, my life', which improve the lives of millions of Brazilians and which generate new prospects for the country. "(Narrator in Off about images of Lula and Dilma in governmental action, 17/08/2010)

Accordingly, Lula acted as the partisan institution, performing the same function. In other words, following the Watterberg analysis, the PT began to be seen by the angle of its main leader: the President of the Republic. The compromise that Lula took over with the elector to recommend the nomination of his party companion was not personal, by friendship or common political trajectory: Lula met Dilma in 2003

and said this at the campaign. The commitment of both with the electorate was in terms of the political agenda: they ruled together and she would be able to continue without him. Accordingly, it's possible to consider that the participation of President Lula in Dilma's campaign was more than the transfer of personal prestige, but, above all, the affirmation of a common political project, i.e., a pact around a partisan political agenda.

"I am very proud to have begun this work and I am definitely sure that Dilma will take the steps still missing to Brazil become a really developed country."  
(President Lula, HGPE, 28/09/2010)

President Lula exercised other party functions during the campaign, as for example, in defending his candidate from attacks and accusing opponents of an unfair campaign. As Lula wasn't a candidate in that election, he could attack the main opponent of his party, preserving Dilma from the wear that could be caused in her personal image by a negative campaign.

"You know that our candidate Dilma has done a high campaign, discussing proposals and ideas, showing what we did and what we do for Brazil. But, unfortunately, our opponent, candidate from 'wet blanket people', who tend to turn up his nose at everything the Brazilians won in recent years, decided to make personal attacks and lower the level of debate." (President Lula, HGPE, 07/09/2010)

Once again, President Lula acted as guarantor of his successor, i.e. as the party itself. He claimed that the campaign of his candidate was positive and based on relevant issues, while your opponent would have a negative stance, unsympathetic to the results of the Government and anti-politics, insofar as he used to make "personal attacks". What Lula does is 'the critique of the critical', attitude more easily assumed by the governing party than by the opposition, whose main mission is to make criticism of the Government. In recent study Aarts and Blais conclude that positive reviews have a bigger impact on the electoral decision than negative ones, stating the existence of a bias of positivity in the electoral decision and rejecting the hypothesis of negativity (Aarts and Blais, 2011, page 179).

"There is no evidence that negative advertising or campaigning is more effective than positive advertising and/or that voters punish governments for bad economic times but do not reward them for good times". (Aarts e Blais, 2011, pág. 180)

The case of the election of Dilma Rousseff in 2010 for the Presidency of Brazil confirms the results found by Aarts and Blais. If, on the one hand, the negative campaign of the PSDB was not able to accredit their candidate to victory, on the other hand, the socioeconomic results of Lula's government favoured the nomination of his successor, which was unknown to the electorate and had never passed by the test of

the ballot before. The victory of the PT's candidate reflected the approval of Lula's government along most of the electorate. The idea of a shared government between the President and his successor was a partisan and effective strategy. It was a partisan strategy insofar as it assured that the Government continuity was independent from the leadership of Lula; the policies implemented were part of a common political project, an agenda mediated by the PT, although the party almost never had been directly mentioned. It was an effective strategy because it convinced the majority of the electorate that had approved this agenda to vote for Dilma.

## **Conclusion**

This article has had as its purpose to prepare a partisan image diagnosis in electoral propaganda on television during the Brazilian presidential campaigns, since the democratization. The goals which guided this research were to identify the intensity of partisan visibility, both visual and discursive, in order to rank the relevance of the role of each party in their "own spectacle", since the HGPE is distributed in partisan terms, according to the size of each parliamentary bench.

The first set of data presented highlights the irrelevance of the partisan image in presidential campaigns of all competing parties. This is the most obvious symptom of the increasing professionalization of presidential campaigns in Brazil, which has as a consequence, according to the academic literature, the weakening of the role of the parties in the campaigns of their candidates. Television campaigns for legislative positions stood out by the intensity of the partisan signs at the presentation of the candidates. This phenomenon is explained, first, by the Brazilian electoral system which sums up the votes given to the individual candidates and the votes given to the party in the calculation of the party coefficient. Secondly, the use of the time intended to campaigns for the legislature in the promotion of the candidature to executive position of the same party has also contributed to the high level of partisanship of those campaigns.

In such a diverse environment, I chose to work on this article exclusively with presidential campaigns: the partisan image could therefore be examined in the context of scarcity, reducing the irrelevance of party strategy and making comparable parties among themselves.

Since 1994, the presidential elections in Brazil have been polarized between two parties, the ones who participated in the six elections that occurred during the analyzed time: PT and PSDB. Between 1989 and 1998, the PT was second in the vote; between 2002 and 2010, the PSDB finished second. Except for in 1989, the remaining

elections were won by these two parties: 1994 and 1998 by PSDB; 2002, 2006 and 2010 by PT. Thus, the Brazilian electoral system became virtually a two-party system, since only two parties are capable of winning presidential elections, which explains why the qualitative analysis in this paper has focused on them.

The quantitative analysis has generated the following conclusions:

- ✓ Among the parties analyzed, only the PT can be considered "protagonist" of his election campaign;
- ✓ PDT and PPS, the other two parties analyzed for having participated in three of the six campaigns, have acted, on average, as "supporting cast";
- ✓ The PSDB has acted, on average, as a "figurative character" in its campaigns, featuring himself as the party that bet more on individualist strategy.

After counting the partisan references in each campaign, both visual and verbal, the type of image that each party had designed was analysed: intense, diffuse or indirect. In the campaigns of the PT and PDT the projection of intense or explicit party image predominated. In the campaigns of PPS and PSDB, there wasn't prevalence of any type of image, although there was significant use of indirect and diffuse images. The PSDB was the only party whose fuzzy image was more often used than the intense image, emphasizing its personalized profile.

In 2010 the individualist profile of presidential campaigns of PSDB won contours even more accentuated in the explicit adoption of the anti-party argument. Such an argument already had been outlined since 1994, when PSDB articulated an alliance with the Liberal Party (PFL), present-day Democrats (DEM), and won the presidential election with Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In 1994 the idea of the supremacy of national interest over sectoral interests was already registered in the PSDB's campaign, justifying the alliance between social democracy and liberalism, but in 2006 such an argument began to transform itself into feeling anti-partido. The intensification of the technocratic-individualist argument and the rejection of the political party as a democratic institution by the PSDB's campaign has an obvious political reason: to weaken the opponent by best characterizes it, partisan discipline and organization. As we discussed above, the PT is the more consistent Brazilian party, both in ties with the electorate as in control over their elites, which is confirmed by its direct participation in campaigns.

The Government that ended in 2010 under the command of President Lula had high approval ratings. The growth of the economy, the increase in the number of formal jobs and the success of social programs have not contributed to the construction of an opposition campaign based on retrospective arguments. In this scenario, the campaign of the PSDB invested in the prestige of its candidate, in the argument of moral

superiority and individual capacity to build unity and articulate the common good in place of partisan politics. It was presented as something vile and threatening.

The aspect that stood out in the presidential campaign of PT in 2010 was the intense participation of President Lula in the defence of the candidature of who would be his successor. His influence in the choice of the voter is considered by many analysts to be the key to the success of the PT's campaign. In this article, I tried to analyze the nature of Lula's participation in the campaign and I have concluded that, contrary to the logic of common sense, this wasn't meant to be the decline of the Workers ' Party or its fragility in the campaign, but rather confirmed the electoral success of the partisan strategy. Lula incarnated the PT when he said that to vote for Dilma Rousseff would be equivalent to vote for him, once they were partners in the same political project, not avowedly partisan, because of a widespread anti-party feeling in the electorate, but with the same implicit meant.

The function of the political party in any democracy is to bring together people with an ideology and a common project. When Lula said that the participation of Dilma in his Government was crucial for the success achieved and that its continuity would be assured with her election, he favoured the transfer of its popularity – not as a charismatic leader, because it couldn't be transferred, but as a ruler – to the candidate of his party. The strategy adopted in the campaign when invested in the image of President Lula was therefore not personalised, but partisan, assuming a collective project whose symbols were the star, the trademark of the PT, and the colour red.

The Red Star is a universal symbol of political-ideological guidelines of the left, especially Socialists and Communists. This is the star in Che Guevara beret, universal symbol of the leftist Revolutionary Movement, especially in Latin America. The people do not need theoretical knowledge on the subject, it is in the public domain, common sense. In this sense, the prominence of the party's symbol in the PT campaign, especially in 2010, is even more eloquent than his own initials, and sustains an ideological content which is even more robust. The star was recorded in 54% of segments analysed in the PT's campaign in 2010. Just to compare, the Toucan, symbol of the PSDB and protagonist of its 1989's campaign (recorded in one third of the segments examined) appeared only twice in the presidential campaign of 2010. This shows that PT has not had their identity weakened by the governmental experience. The star is certainly a tag, however, a tag loaded with meaning.

Red is the predominant colour on the flags of most social democratic parties, nationalists, Socialists and Communists. As well as the star, the red colour has an implicit ideological significance. The 2010's campaign was one of the most red of the period. The red colour has always been present in the campaigns, in particular through

images of rallies, a reserve of the strength of PT. This year, however, was even more evident, insofar as it was "dressed" by the candidate. In all television programmes broadcast, Dilma Rousseff appears at least once dressed in red. This shows a candidate's personal commitment to the values of the left and, above all, a commitment to the PT, party in which she belatedly joined, after passing by the PDT.

In its final stretch, the campaign of 2010 has become one of the most disgraceful episodes in Brazilian political history: political arguments were exchanged for moral arguments, politics and religion were mixed, injuring the principle of secularism in the modern State, essential institutions to democracy were attacked. The Internet, which has not been the object of analysis in this article, became the vehicle for the attack between candidates: in this environment can be found moral accusations, ideological discussions, and libelous electronic messages. Therefore, the Internet becomes progressively a fruitful field for the academic research of electoral processes; essential agenda for future studies.

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